The agreement was drawn up by the trilateral contact group on Ukraine, made up of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE.  The group was established in June to facilitate dialogue and conflict resolution in eastern and southern Ukraine. On 31 July, 26 August, 1 September and 5 September 2014 informal meetings of the group and informal representatives of the separatist People`s Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk took place. The details of the agreement signed on 5 September 2014 were largely similar to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko`s “15-point peace plan” of 20 June 2014. The following representatives signed the document: The realistic argument here is that the agreement failed because it did not explicitly take into account Russia`s security concerns, leaving Ukraine to declare neutral and would not seek to join the EU or NATO. Although Minsk II contained points for granting more autonomy, amnesty and promise of elections to separatist regions, such concerns are important to realists, but they do not go any further. For the scholars of realism, any agreement that ignores the threat and fear of hard power and geopolitics, or worse, as if it did not exist, is doomed to failure. The unfortunate fact is that fear of the security problem fuels national politics, because, as Thucydides wrote in the Melian dialogue, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer from what they need.”  On March 2, 2016, michael Carpenter, a member of the U.S. Department of Defense, said that at least 430 Ukrainian soldiers had died since the signing of Minsk II, that Russia had “command and control ties” over the DPR and the LPR, and that Russia was dumping “heavy weapons” into the Donbass.  The Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Ukraine Alexander Hug said on 25 March 2016 that from the beginning of the conflict, the OSCE had observed “armed persons with Russian insignia” in the Donbass in combat, talked to prisoners who said they were Russian soldiers and that they had “seen tire tracks, not the vehicles themselves, but the tracks of vehicles crossing the Russian border”.  Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on 27 March 2016 that Russia “is not a party to the Minsk agreements” and that the agreements are “two opposing sides.”  However, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe states that the Minsk Protocol also includes the release of hostages who have been abducted from Ukrainian territory and are being held illegally in Russia. B as Nadia Savchenko and Oleg Sentsov.  History Channel.
“Ukraine declares independence.” History Channel: This Day in History, 2017. www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ukraine-declares-its-independ…. Lewis, Martin. “Ukrainian regionalism and the federal option.” Geostrom, 2014. www.geocurrents.info/place/russia-ukraine-and-caucasus/ukrainian-…. Nine of the 13 points of the agreement concern conflict management: a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact line (Articles 1 to 3); an amnesty for combat participants (Article 5); the exchange of hostages and people unlawfully arrested (Article 6); Humanitarian aid (Article 7); the resumption of socio-economic relations between Ukraine and occupied Donbass (Article 8); the withdrawal from Ukraine of “all foreign armed formations, military equipment and also mercenaries” and the disarmament of “all illegal groups” (Article 10); and the activities of the TCG (Article 13).